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1. Introduction. 
 
The increasing globalization of economic life has been accompanied by a globalization of the 
field of public finance, in the sense that the international aspects of the field have been 
receiving much more attention than they did before. The process began with an increasing 
interest in the area of international taxation, motivated by the liberalization of trade and factor 
movements that has been such a dominant feature of the development of the international 
economy over the last few decades. Only more recently has the expenditure or benefit side of 
the public finances been given similar attention, with global public goods being the central 
theoretical concept of a rapidly expanding literature.  
 
What are global public goods? It is natural to approach this question by considering the 
standard definition of public goods, viz. that a public good is one whose use by one person 
does not reduce the amount that others can consume (Samuelson 1954). This is a very general 
definition which does not include a specification of the set of people to which it applies. Much 
of the literature has - sometimes implicitly - adopted the assumption that the definition applies 
to the population of the nation state, a popular example being national defence. But since the 
definition is essentially a technological one, it can be adapted to other institutional settings, 
and the first major application to develop after Samuelson’s path-breaking 1954 paper was 
that of local public goods. The theory of global public goods represents the development of 
the theory in the opposite direction, focusing on goods that are public in the most general 
sense of the term: Their use by one person in the world does not reduce the amount that other 
persons in the world can consume. 
 
Here are some examples of global public goods that have been discussed in the literature: 
 
Biodiversity and the natural environment. Most of us enjoy the benefits from the natural 
environment in which we live or to which we have easy access. These benefits may be 
material, as when an unspoilt environment provides us with clean air and opportunities for 
physical exercise, but they are sometimes of a more intellectual or aesthetic nature. Moreover, 
benefits of the latter kind are not only derived from our immediate surroundings; we take 
pleasure in our knowledge of the natural majesty of the Himalayan Mountains and the wildlife 
of the Arctic, even if we personally have not and will never have the opportunity to observe 
Mount Everest or the life of the polar bear at close quarters. 
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The global climate. Global warming is a topic that has received enormous attention in recent 
years, with economists playing leading roles in the debate. The Stern Review (2007) has made 
us aware of the fact that the climate not only has strong elements of being a global public 
consumption good that yields immediate and future consumption benefits, but that it also is a 
public production good, affecting production possibilities in a number of different ways, not 
least for the world’s poorest. The fact that an increase in the global temperature may yield 
positive benefits to some people and negative benefits to others is not inconsistent with the 
definition of the climate as a public good, since uniformity of benefits is not part of the 
definition of such goods.   
 
The cultural heritage. The cities, buildings and other memorials of the past constitute a 
common cultural heritage that in principle can be enjoyed by all people in the world. This is 
recognized in UNESCO’s concept of World Heritage sites, a list of properties deemed to be of 
outstanding universal value. UNESCO itself has clearly described the global public good 
nature of these properties as follows: “World Heritage sites belong to all the peoples of the 
world, irrespective of the territory on which they are located.”1  
 
Knowledge. New knowledge about the natural world, the functioning of society and 
mankind’s artistic expression is produced every day and to a large extent becomes the 
common property of mankind. Clearly, people sometimes have strong incentives to prevent 
others from enjoying these common benefits by exploiting monopoly or patent positions, but 
at any rate knowledge is potentially a global public good. 
   
World peace. That world peace, the absence of war and national insecurity with all that it 
implies for human welfare, is a global public good is hardly in need of supporting arguments. 
But the example is of particular interest in reminding us of the different perspectives that we 
have to take in thinking about national and global public goods. A leading example of a 
national public good is national defence. But military expenditure is not only used for 
defensive purposes; if that were true there would be no need for it. The case for devoting 
resources to military expenditure may be strong from the point of view of the nation’s welfare 
but vanishing for the world as a whole. 
                                                 
1 The list of sites also includes places of exceptional natural beauty. For a further description of the 1972 World 
Heritage Treaty and the current list of properties see http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/. 
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A few general observations may be in order concerning these examples. From the viewpoint 
of public finance it is perhaps not obvious which items in the public budgets correspond to 
these goods. In some of the examples the public goods themselves are, at any point in time, 
determined by nature or by past history. But public expenditure, e.g. on the funding of 
national parks or the preservation of historic cities, will contribute to the quality of the public 
goods that we leave to posterity. It is typical of the examples that the public good itself is in 
the nature of a stock which has accumulated over time, and that current policies only 
determine flows that add to or subtract from the stocks. This has to be kept in mind when 
interpreting more formal models of allocation of resources to global public goods, which 
often abstract from these dynamic relationships. 
 
Another point that needs to be kept in mind is that although the availability of a public good is 
the same for all, the individual valuation of it is likely to vary substantially (as in the case of 
global warming). One obvious reason for this is that tastes differ, but from a policy point of 
view it is just as important to realize that another reason lies in the enormous variations in 
opportunities that we observe in the global economy. For people living on minimal resources, 
the valuation of World Heritage sites in distant countries is likely to be zero not only because 
of the nature of their preferences, but also because of their lack of knowledge concerning 
these sites and of the resources needed to acquire the complementary private goods that are 
necessary to enjoy them, such as books, television sets and travel. 
 
2. Some history of thought. 
 
Although the concepts of public goods in general and global public goods in particular are of 
relatively recent origin, their beginnings can be traced back to the classical writers in our 
subject. Thus, Adam Smith maintained that one of the central functions of a government was 
that of 
 
“... erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, 
which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, 
however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expence to any 
individual or small number of individuals.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 723) 
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The proposition that some goods yield public or collective benefits and that market incentives 
may for that reason be inadequate for an efficient provision of them, lies just below the 
surface of this formulation. However, the great society and the government which Smith had 
in mind were clearly related to the nation state. A large part of the Wealth of Nations may be 
read as advice to governments on the design of good policies, and Smith was a theorist with a 
practical orientation who did not concern himself with giving advice to a fictitious world 
government.  
 
In the middle of the following century John Stuart Mill took a broader view of the tasks of 
government. After discussing the protection of private property as one of the central functions 
of the state he posed a rhetorical question to which he also gave a firm answer: 
 
“But is there nothing recognised as property except what has been produced? Is there 
not the earth itself, its forests and waters, and all other natural riches, above and below 
the surface? These are the inheritance of the human race, and there must be regulations 
for the common enjoyment of it. What rights, and under what conditions, a person 
shall be allowed to exercise over any portion of this common inheritance, cannot be 
left undecided. No function of government is less optional than the regulation of these 
things, or more completely involved in the idea of civilized society.” (Mill 1848; 1965, 
p. 801.) 
 
However, in reading this powerful statement, one wishes that Mill had pursued the issue 
further. The expression “inheritance of the human race” clearly indicates that there are some 
types of property that are common to more than the inhabitants of the nation state, and it is not 
made very clear how a national government can incorporate an effective concern for this 
inheritance in its own set of functions. 
 
Although the beginnings of a formal theory of public goods provision can be found in the 
writings of Italian, German and Swedish economists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
modern theory was founded in a short article by Paul Samuelson (1954; see also Samuelson 
1955, 1958). Samuelson introduced a precise analytical definition of public goods as the case 
where total and individual consumption of a good are indistinguishable, and he formulated the 
theory in terms of welfare economics. The problem that he set out to solve was the 
characterization of the conditions for optimal resource allocation, optimality being defined in 
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terms of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. Assuming that the economy was on its 
production efficiency frontier and that public expenditure, including spending on 
redistribution schemes, could be financed by individualized lump-sum taxes, he derived the 
famous “Samuelson rule” which says that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution 
between any pair of public and private goods should be equal to their marginal rate of 
transformation. The “rule” can also be derived without explicit use of the social welfare 
function as a subset of the conditions for Pareto optimality of a mixed private-public goods 
economy. But since any Pareto optimum corresponds to a particular set of (marginal) weights 
of a social welfare function, the two approaches really come to the same thing. 
 
Samuelson did not commit himself to a specific definition of the set of people benefiting from 
the public good, although a natural interpretation is that he mainly had the nation state in 
mind. An important outgrowth of the theory was the study of local public goods, while the 
study of global goods took longer to develop. It was mentioned and clearly recognized by 
Olson (1971, p. 171), but in this area it is perhaps fair to say that the applications came before 
the general theory, since during the following decades, one can find a number of contributions 
which deal with topics that one would now define as examples of, if not global, at least 
multinational public goods. There was a considerable literature in the natural resource field 
that concerned itself with “the global commons”, and there emerged a literature on military 
and other trans-national alliances that had many features in common with the Samuelson 
theory of public goods2. Research on the economics of global public goods received a big 
push a few years ago when a group of researchers at the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) made an effort to move the subject to the forefront of both the policy and 
academic discussion by bringing a number of economists together to discuss various aspects 
of the topic. This resulted in three books3 that contain a number of interesting contributions 
and together constitute an important source of reference.  
 
3. A global welfare maximum. 
 
It is possible to take the view that the extension of the theory of public goods from the 
national to the international level does not require much in the way of discussion and 
                                                 
2 See Sandler and Hartley (2001) for a survey of this literature. 
3 These are Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven and Mendoza (2003) and Kaul and 
Conceição (2006).  
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reflection; all that is needed is a reinterpretation of the variables of the Samuelson model. I 
will argue that this attitude may be too superficial, and that a reconsideration of the various 
elements of that model makes us aware of some of the central difficulties in thinking about 
global public goods.  
 
Not everyone is comfortable with the concept of a social welfare function, and if one is 
uneasy about it when applied to the national economy, then a fortiori there would seem to be 
every reason to be sceptical to its use on a global scale4. A way to avoid it is to focus on 
Pareto optimality, but an analysis of the production and consumption of global public goods 
that abstracts from distributional aspects becomes fairly artificial. Moreover, any allocation 
that represents an optimum relative to a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is 
necessarily also a Pareto optimum, so nothing is lost by taking the broader approach. 
Obviously, the analytical use of this type of function does not imply a belief in a global 
mastermind that allocates the world’s resources. It simply helps us to understand the nature of 
the global trade-off between equity and efficiency for anyone whose view of the relationship 
between individual utility and social welfare can be represented by this class of social welfare 
functions. 
 
For simplicity, I shall assume that the world consists of just two countries, one rich and one 
poor. There are n individuals in the rich country and m in the poor country. The global social 
welfare function can then be written as 
 
(1) W = W(u1R,…., unR; u1P,…., umP).   
 
Note that this formulation does not assume that global social welfare is in some systematic 
way related to national welfare levels; instead it is assumed in general to depend directly on 
individual utilities. Letting global welfare depend on some notion of national “welfares” could 
be taken to imply a belief that such “welfares” exist as representations of official targets for 
national policy, and I do not wish to make such an assumption. One could argue that having 
W depend on some national welfare functions, say WR and WP, could simply be taken to 
reflect some arguably natural assumption about separability, but this is not really attractive. It 
would imply, loosely speaking, that our attitude to inequality in the rich country would be 
                                                 
4 An early statement of the need to take a global welfare view of the development of international economic 
institutions can be found in Frankel (1943).  
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independent of the standard of living of individuals in the poor country. While the formulation 
(1) admits this kind of assumption as a special case, as a general formulation it does not seem 
to capture what many of us would consider to be reasonable judgements about global 
inequality. 
 
The arguments of the utility functions in (1) must in general be thought of as comprising 
several kinds of goods - pure private goods as well as local, national and global public goods. 
In the interests of simplicity I abstract from local and national public goods, and I also assume 
that there is just one global public good, while private goods are treated in terms of a single 
aggregate. This means that the utility functions can be written as 
 
(2)  uiR = uiR(xiR, G) and ujP = ujP(xjP, G).  ( i =1,….,n; j =1,….,m)  
 
Following the tradition established by Samuelson, I have modelled the global public good as a 
consumption good. This is of course a simplification. As the introductory examples showed, 
some of the most important classes of global public goods should also be thought of as 
production goods or public factors of production. An extension of the model in this direction 
will be considered in Section 5 below, but to begin with I choose to focus on the standard case 
of public goods as consumption goods. The basic issues that arise in the broadening of the 
perspective from the national to the global stage are in any case independent of this particular 
issue. 
 
The description of the production side of the economy proceeds in two steps. On the one hand 
it is assumed that both countries devote some of their resources to provide the global public 
good, and that the global provision is simply the sum of the individual countries’ contribution: 
 
(3) G = gR + gP.         
  
Each of the countries is constrained in its output of private and public goods by technology 
and factor supplies, and these constraints are summarized as 
 
(4) FR(xR, gR) = 0  and FP(xP, gP) = 0.      
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Here xR and xP are the aggregate quantities of private goods produced in the rich and the poor 
country, respectively. I shall refer to the marginal rate of transformation between the private 
and the public good as the marginal cost of producing the public good. 
 
Formally, the main difference between the present formulation and the standard one lies in the 
disaggregated treatment of the production side. In the original Samuelson model the economy 
was assumed to be on its production possibility frontier; in other words, factors of production 
were assumed to be efficiently allocated between sectors of the economy. In the present 
context this would amount to assuming that the world as a whole is on its production 
possibility frontier. It is not natural to introduce this in the form of an assumption in the 
present setting, although we should naturally expect it to emerge as a possible result of global 
welfare maximization. 
 
It now remains to specify the connection between world consumption and production of the 
private good, and here I will explore the consequences of two alternative assumptions. The 
first, on which I will concentrate in the following, can be written as 
 
(5) ΣixiR + ΣjxjP = xR + xP. 
 
This equation may look innocuous, but in fact it has rather far-reaching consequences. It 
implies that each country’s consumption is constrained by world production, so that it is 
perfectly possible for a country to consume more than it produces. Note also that the 
assumption applies to an aggregate of all private goods, so that it does not simply represent 
the case of an open economy which consumes at a point outside its production frontier; 
instead it implies that the value of consumption may exceed the value of production. This can 
only be the case if there exist international transfers, so that e.g. there is a net positive volume 
of transfer payments from the rich to the poor country. This is obviously a very significant 
assumption to make about the global economy. 
 
Given these elements of the model we may proceed to study the optimality conditions. I will 
skip all derivations and simply state the results. First of all, the allocation of resources must 
satisfy the condition for global production efficiency, so that the marginal cost of producing 
the public good should be the same in both countries. This result can be written as 
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(6)   MCR = MCP ≡ MC, 
 
where the last term simply denotes the common value of the marginal cost. Whatever amount 
of the global public good it is desirable to produce, production should be carried out at the 
lowest possible cost, defined in terms of the amount of foregone consumption of the private 
good for the world as a whole. 
 
How much of the public good should be produced? This is determined by the Samuelson rule, 
which it is convenient to write as  
 
(7) ∑iMRSiR  + ∑jMRSjP  = MC, or  ∑iMRSiR/MC  + ∑jMRSjP/MC  = 1. 
 
The aggregate marginal willingness to pay - the sum of the marginal rates of substitution over 
all individuals in the global economy - should be equal to the common marginal cost; this is 
equivalent to the statement that the marginal benefit-cost ratio for the world as a whole equals 
one. Note that each person’s marginal willingness to pay carries the same weight, irrespective 
of whether national or international differences among individuals are due to tastes or 
resources. Together, (6) and (7) constitute the conditions for a Pareto optimum of the world 
economy. 
 
The final set of optimality conditions requires that the social marginal utility of consumption 
is the same for all individuals 
 
(8) SMUiR =SMUjP     (i=1,...,n; j=1,...,m) 
 
Here the SMU stands for the marginal welfare effect of an increased consumption of the 
private good; the equality of these across individuals and countries is the condition for a just 
distribution of resources among individuals. Here “just” is to be understood in terms of the 
ethical judgments expressed by the marginal weights attached to the individual utilities in the 
social welfare function. Equations (6)-(8) constitute the complete characterization of an 
optimal world allocation of private and public goods. 
 
4. Constraints on international redistribution. 
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It is well known that the policy instruments that are necessary for bringing about conditions 
(8) consist of a set of individualized lump sum transfers that do not interfere with the 
efficiency of the economic system. The model as presented here is of course highly stylized, 
but if it were to be generalized to accommodate several commodities and factors of 
production, the requirement would be that transfers should not distort relative prices, and this 
implies that both commodity and income taxes must be ruled out. Note that these transfers 
must occur both between individuals in each of the two countries and in the world as a whole. 
We have to think of the world income distribution as being optimal, not simply the income 
distributions in the two countries taken separately.  
 
We know from the general theory of the second best that if one set of optimality conditions 
does not hold, then in general the remaining conditions have to be modified also. The second 
best issue that I wish to focus on here is the following: What happens to the conditions for 
Pareto optimality (6)-(7) if the conditions (8) for optimal income distribution cannot be 
satisfied? A realistic view might be that the distributive conditions are unlikely to be satisfied, 
neither within each of the two countries nor for the world as a whole, but I wish here to focus 
on the international dimension. The extent of redistribution is certainly much larger within a 
single country than between the rich and the poor countries of the world. We represent this by 
the extreme assumption that while there are perfect redistributive transfers within countries, 
there are no transfers whatever between countries5. 
 
Analytically, in the absence of international transfers, each country’s consumption of private 
goods must be limited to its own output. Equation (5) has therefore to be replaced by the pair 
of conditions  
 
(9) ΣixiR = xR,  ΣjxjP = xP. 
 
In this artificial one-commodity model, where the single private good represents an aggregate 
of all private consumer goods and factor inputs, it is worth pointing out that assumption (9) 
does not rule out international trade. Instead, the two conditions may be taken to represent the 
balance of payments constraints in the absence of international transfers, in particular 
                                                 
5 Economics has of course a long tradition of theorizing in terms of extreme or polar cases. The distinction 
between private and public goods is itself an example of this. Another example, which is more closely related to 
the present discussion is the Ricardian assumption of perfect domestic factor mobility coupled with zero 
international mobility. 
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transfers from the rich to the poor country. In equation (5), by contrast, the value of a 
country’s consumption was allowed to differ from the value of its production, precisely 
because of the existence of such transfers. 
 
With the new assumptions, what happens to the production efficiency result and the 
optimality condition for global public goods? First of all, the availability of transfers in the 
national context means that there will be a common value of the social marginal utility of 
consumption within each of the two countries; call these SMUR and SMUP. Given that the 
levels of private consumption are lower in the poor country, and on the assumtion that the 
social welfare function exhibits inequality aversion, we will have that SMUR<SMUP. When 
this holds, it follows that 
 
(10) MCR > MCP. 
 
If marginal costs or marginal rates of transformation are increasing, it follows that the rich 
country should devote more resources to producing the global public good than called for by 
pure production efficiency. Starting from the production efficiency benchmark, transferring 
some public good production to the rich country would increase the resources available for 
private goods production in the poor country, and a move in this direction would increase 
world welfare. While global production efficiency is a desirable property of an unconstrained 
global optimum, this is no longer the case when international redistribution is no longer a 
feasible option6.  
 
The cost-benefit rule for public goods provision becomes  
 
(11)  ∑iMRSiR/MCR  + ∑jMRSjP/MCP  = 1, 
 
and this should be compared with (7). Instead of the first best requirement that the global 
marginal benefit-cost ratio should equal one, this condition says that it is the sum of the 
national benefit-cost ratios which, at the optimum, should be equal to unity.  
 
                                                 
6 A similar result would obviously hold for less stringent constraints on international redistribution. As the scope 
for international redistribution increases, one would expect the optimum to move closer to the first best case of 
global production efficiency. 
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An obvious implication of either of the two versions of the global Samuelson rule is that 
optimality requires each of the countries to have a national benefit-cost ratio which is less 
than one; in other words, they must push production of the public good to a point where the 
domestic marginal cost exceeds the domestic marginal benefit. This feature of the optimum 
raises serious questions about national incentives in regard to global welfare, and I will come 
back to these later.  
 
5. The global public good as a factor of production. 
 
It is not obvious that we ought to think about global public goods as consumption goods. In 
fact, when we go back to reconsider the introductory examples, it is easy to see that all of 
them can also be interpreted as production goods or factors of production. Think of the natural 
environment and the global climate in relation to agriculture and fisheries, knowledge in 
relation to industrial development, or world peace in relation to almost any economic activity 
except armaments, and it is obvious that the major types of global public goods confer both 
consumption and production benefits on society. If we were to model the benefits of a specific 
public good like the development of a drug to prevent cancer, we ought clearly to include both 
consumption and production benefits. Here I would simply like to indicate briefly how to 
model the case of pure production benefits, leaving the mixed cases aside. 
 
We now leave out the public good from the utility functions of the consumers, instead 
introducing it in the production constraints, which can be written as 
 
(12)      FR(xR, gR, G) = 0,  and FP(xP, gP, G) = 0. 
 
The functions FR and FP, while increasing in the first two arguments, are decreasing in G. 
This normalization assumption serves to capture the role of the public good as an input factor 
that expands production possibilities in each of the two countries. Since I am using the private 
good as the numéraire commodity, it will be convenient to measure this effect in each of the 
countries by the increased output of the private good which is made possible by an increased 
supply of the global public good. This is of course the marginal rate of transformation 
between the two goods, but to convey the economics more clearly, I shall refer to it as the 
marginal output effect (MOE) of the global public good. In the first best case, i.e. where 
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perfect international transfers are allowed, the optimal world allocation of the production of 
the global public good is characterized by the condition 
 
(13) MCR = MCP ≡ MC, 
 
which is identical to equation (6) above: The optimal pattern of the production of public 
goods across countries is that which minimizes the resource cost for the world as a whole. To 
find the optimal scale of production we need to equate the common marginal cost to the world 
benefit, which is the effect on production possibilities for the world as a whole. Formally, this 
optimality condition can be written as 
 
(14)     MOER + MOEP = MC. 
 
The common marginal cost should be equal to the marginal global benefit, which is the sum 
of marginal output effects across countries. Because I have treated the domestic production 
constraint as an aggregate (assuming domestic production efficiency), there is a difference in 
the treatment of  consumption and production benefits as regards the explicit aggregation of 
benefits over domestic agents, but the basic notion of marginal domestic benefits from the 
global public good is fundamentally the same. 
 
I refrain from presenting further details about the global public good as a factor of production. 
But it may be useful to point out that the case with no international redistribution gives rise to 
similar modifications as in the consumption case. Marginal costs of production should be 
higher in the rich country, which, in the interests of equity, should devote more resources for 
the global benefit. Moreover, condition (14) for the optimal scale of production should be 
modified to look formally similar to equation (11), implying a relatively greater weight on the 
production benefit that accrues to the poor country.  
 
6. Externalities: The carbon tax. 
 
”... the weather is clearly an exogenous or non-economic variable, affecting individual 
choices but unaffected by them.” (Graaff 1957, p. 6.) 
 
“Rainfall affects the economy but is not affected by the economy.” (Klein 1962, p. 16.) 
 
 15
These quotations are interesting illustrations of the fact that, fifty years ago, even the world’s 
top economists were unaware of a connection that immediately comes to people’s minds 
today as they are introduced to the concept of global public goods. At present it must be taken 
as established beyond any reasonable doubt that greenhouse gas emissions contribute to 
global warming, and that the emissions of any one consumer or firm create negative 
environmental externalities for individuals and firms all over the world. Although the 
discussion so far has been limited to the production and consumption of public goods in the 
more specific sense of the word, there is clearly a close connection between public goods and 
externalities. Indeed, externalities can be seen as the results of actions that indirectly affect the 
availability of public goods. The quality of the public good - the global climate, in this case - 
is determined by the aggregate outcome of billions of individual decisions regarding the 
technology of production in firms and households, modes of transportation and travel 
patterns, residential location and a number of other characteristics of modern economic life. 
 
Economists have a long tradition of diagnosis and policy recommendation in this area. The 
standard recommendation is the use of Pigouvian taxes on harmful activities. The tax should 
be set at a level that reflects the marginal social damage of the activity, which is measured by 
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the quality of the environment and 
private consumption7. This is of course the public good component of the private activity, i.e. 
its negative contribution to the availability of the public good in question. A uniform tax on 
all polluters has the property that the marginal cost of reducing pollution - or the marginal 
cost of contributing to the production of the public good - will be equalized across polluters, 
thus ensuring production efficiency in environmental policy. The ideal Pigouvian tax will 
therefore lead to a social optimum characterized both by production efficiency and by an 
optimal balancing of the benefits and costs of environmental policy. Applied to the specific 
case of CO2 emissions, the optimal carbon tax should be globally uniform, a recommendation 
also strongly emphasized in the Stern Review (2007). 
 
However, it must be kept in mind that this is a characterization of the first best, where there 
are no constraints on the use of policy instruments; in particular, lump sum transfers are 
                                                 
7 A demonstration of this result and further elaboration of the connection between environmental externalities 
and public goods can be found in Sandmo (2000). 
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included in the set of feasible policies8. If we accept the lack of realism involved in this 
assumption, we must consider the modifications with respect to tax policy that need to be 
introduced if the problem of efficient allocation cannot be separated from that of an equitable 
distribution of income.   
 
The result follows almost immediately from those derived in the previous section. If lump 
sum international transfers are infeasible or inadequate, and if the global social welfare 
function is egalitarian, the tax in the poor country should be lower than in the rich. This means 
that the marginal cost of contributing to the global public good should be lower in the poor 
country, which allows it to devote more of its resources to the production of private goods. 
Lowering the tax that it has to pay is a way - in fact, under the assumptions made, the only 
way - to transfer income from the rich country. This has a cost in the form of global 
production inefficiency, but a global social welfare function that gives some weight to 
international equality implies that it is rational to pay a cost for a more equitable distribution 
of the cost of climate policy9.  
 
7. Incentives and implementation. 
 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that all governments have found a way to estimate 
national benefits from global public goods, including the global environment. This is 
obviously a drastic simplification, implying that the countries have overcome the difficulties 
associated with eliciting true preferences for public goods. Once again, however, the 
justification is that the simplification allows us to focus on the international dimension. The 
next step is now to arrive at a measure of global benefits. If we envisage the governments of 
the world negotiating about an environmental treaty, the objectives of the treaty would be 
first, to decide on the amount of the public good to be produced and second, to agree on a 
division of the cost of production among the parties to the agreement. It is natural to assume 
that during the process of negotiation the representatives of each country know their own 
country’s benefits and costs, but that these are not known - or at least less well known - to the 
negotiators of other countries.  
                                                 
8 The Stern Review (2007, p. 364) remarks, after arguing the case for a uniform carbon tax, that ”an additional 
mechanism would need to be put in place to transfer resources to developing countries.” 
9 In order to move the analysis closer to real world policy issues we must consider the implications of this result 
for a world of many countries. Country-specific tax rates may be politically difficult, and an alternative might be 
a small number of tax rates, each applying to a group of countries. For further discussions of this see Sandmo 
(2005). 
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Each country then finds itself in a situation which in terms of strategic considerations is 
similar to that of a single individual with respect to the national government. Within the 
international community of nations most countries are small compared to the world as a 
whole. By overrepresenting its marginal costs or underrepresenting its marginal willingness to 
pay for the global public good a country may conceivably reduce the amount of resources that 
it will actually have to contribute without, in its own view, influencing the global provision of 
such goods appreciably. But if all countries reason along similar lines, the result will be 
underprovision of global public goods - a standard result in the theory of public goods.  
 
How serious is this international free rider problem? Again a crucial consideration is the 
availability of policy instruments for international redistribution. Consider first the condition 
(7) for optimal provision with unrestricted international transfers. If this condition is not 
satisfied, it is in principle possible to improve the situation for all countries through a 
combination of public goods adjustment and international transfers. One could envisage a 
Wicksell-Lindahl system of international bargaining that would make it possible to convert a 
situation characterized by potential Pareto improvement to one of actual improvement, 
provided that the transfer mechanisms were sufficiently fine-tuned and flexible. This would 
not eliminate the incentive problems; individual countries might still find it in their own 
interest to report high costs and low benefits in order to increase their net gains from 
international transfers. Still, the combination of contributions to global public goods provision 
and income transfers would increase the possibility of achieving a global optimum, compared 
to the case with no transfers. 
 
The latter case can be understood by considering condition (11), which generalizes easily to 
an arbitrary number of countries. In the absence of international transfers the marginal 
benefit-cost ratios should sum to unity. But this means that at the global optimum each 
individual country's ratio must be less than one. In other words, since a part of the benefits 
generated by the country in question accrues to other countries, all of them will be asked to 
contribute beyond the point where their domestic marginal benefit-cost ratio equals one. 
Suppose that each country considers only its own welfare. If marginal benefit-cost ratios 
decline with the amount of public goods available, which is a reasonable assumption10, no 
                                                 
10 This follows if marginal benefits decline and marginal costs increase with the level of provision. 
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country would voluntarily use resources for global public goods beyond the point where its 
national benefit-cost ratio equals unity. But this would imply that the sum of these ratios, 
instead of being equal to unity, would be of the order of the number of countries in the world, 
indicating a severe underprovision of global public goods.  
 
When provision of global public goods is combined with international transfers, one can 
imagine a system of international bargaining whereby the rich country offers transfers in 
return for increased production in the poor country, assuming that marginal costs of 
production are lower there. The outcome of such a bargaining process could be envisaged as 
an international Lindahl equilibrium of production and transfers, with countries playing the 
role of individuals in the standard Lindahl model (Johansen (1963)).  We must conclude, 
therefore, that the possibility of achieving efficient and equitable provision of global public 
goods is significantly larger in the presence of international transfers of income than in the 
situation where such transfers are non-existent11.   
 
Some modifications may be in order. The assumption that economic agents always take a 
narrow view of their own self-interest when considering the allocation of resources to public 
goods is hardly realistic. Even for single individuals in large economies we observe that 
people voluntarily donate time and money for the purpose of providing public goods. The 
increased concern for the environment in public policy has to a large extent been influenced 
by voluntary organizations that have been acting as pressure groups. Many individuals, 
obviously, do not see themselves as unable to influence aggregate outcomes like the 
allocation of resources to public goods or the design of policies to modify the effects of 
unregulated private actions. What is true for the single individual in the national economy is 
also likely to be true for a single country in the community of nations, particularly so since a 
number of countries are actually quite large relative to the world as a whole. One might 
therefore expect that, at least to some extent, they might be able to internalize the effects of 
their own actions on the state of the global environment12.  
 
                                                 
11 The combination of anti-pollution measures with international transfers has been discussed in a number of 
contributions to the literature on transfrontier pollution. For a theoretical analysis see Chander and Tulkens 
(1992). Mäler (1991) discusses the problem of practical implementation with numerical illustrations for the case 
of sulphur emissions in Europe.  
12 For a more detailed discussion of the incentive structures for global public goods provision, see Barrett (2001, 
2003). 
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An obvious asymmetry between the provision of public goods to a group of individual 
consumers and to a group of countries is that countries are of different sizes in terms of 
population. Going back to the central optimality condition (7), one sees immediately that 
although all national benefit-cost ratios should, at the optimum, be less than one, they would 
tend to be higher for large than for small countries, simply because the sum of domestic 
benefits would be larger. The larger countries would accordingly have a stronger incentive, 
relatively speaking, to contribute to the public good - assuming that there is no systematic 
tendency for individual preferences for the public good to be lower in the large countries. In 
his pioneering analysis of incentives for public goods provision, Olson (1971) drew the 
conclusion that in public goods negotiations between “large” and “small” members of a 
community, the large would tend to bear a disproportionate burden of the cost, implying that 
there would be “exploitation” of the large by the small. But this is a result in positive 
economics or political economy. Needless to say, in the welfare theoretic framework there can 
be no such bias; by definition, the cost shares have been optimally allocated between nations, 
taking due account both of efficiency and equity considerations. 
 
8. Concluding remarks. 
 
The main focus of the present paper has been on the welfare economics of the supply of 
global public goods. Some people might say that this approach carries utopian thinking in 
economics to its limits - if not beyond. Since the welfare economics approach to economic 
policy is frequently criticized for taking a naive view of the political process, this must be 
even more true for applications to the world as a whole, for which no governmental authority 
exists. There can be no point in deriving policy rules for a non-existing government. 
 
For my own part, I do not agree with this criticism. On the contrary, I believe that welfare 
economics is important for policy analysis even in this case. In my opinion, the discussion in 
Section 7 above of the problems of incentives and implementation demonstrates this clearly. 
It is common to argue that in the international bargaining about climate treaties or the 
preservation of world heritage sites, incentives may be biased to favour national rather than 
global interests. But if we claim that incentives are distorted relative to the achievement of 
some common good for the world as a whole, we need to have a reasonable idea of what this 
common good might be, otherwise it is impossible for us to come up with ideas of how 
incentives could be changed for the common good. In this we as economists can perform a 
 20
useful function even though we are not able to define the common good - Adam Smith’s 
“publick interest” - with a high degree of precision. What we can do is to explore the 
consequences of a particular measure of the common good and see where it leads us. In the 
present discussion the adoption of the Bergson-Samuelson individualistic welfare function has 
led us to the realization that a policy that achieves global production efficiency - a policy 
strongly recommended by many economists - is not a necessary outcome of welfare 
maximization. Whether it is, depends crucially on the existence of systems for the 
international redistribution of income13. Other conceptions of the common good might 
conceivably lead to other conclusions regarding this problem, and these alternative 
approaches need to be explored.  
 
These arguments must not be taken to imply that the positive economics of global public 
goods is of less or even of no interest. This is definitely not true; in fact I believe that the two 
approaches are strongly complementary14. Welfare economics as applied to private production 
and exchange derives much of its interest from being confronted with the positive theories of 
private incentives and market equilibrium. It is from this confrontation that we have derived 
our insights in the conditions for efficiency of market equilibrium and in the trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. In the same way, positive analyses of international provision 
of global public goods need to relate to standards of efficiency and justice in the allocation of 
resources.  
 
 
                                                 
13 A major limitation of the present discussion is that both national and international redistribution are assumed 
to take the form of lump sum transfers. A more general treatment would take into account the marginal cost of 
public funds that arises in domestic economies from the presence of distortionary taxation, as well as the 
possibly distortive effects of transfers on recipient countries. 
14 This is also the view expressed by Atkinson (2001) in his perceptive discussion of welfare economics in 
relation to policy discussions in macroeconomics. 
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Appendix A. Global public consumption goods. 
 
The purpose of the Appendix is to present the derivation of the optimality conditions of the 
main text. In the case of global public consumption goods the problem is to maximize the 
social welfare function (1), given the utility functions (2) and subject to the constraints (3), (4) 
and either of the production-consumption equations (5) or (9). We begin with alternative (9), 
since, once the optimum for this case has been established, the optimum for the case (5) 
follows directly as a special case. 
 
The Lagrangian can be written as 
 
(A1) Λ = W(u1R,…., unR; u1P,…., umP) + λ(gR + gP - G) - μRFR(xR, gR) - μPFP(xP, gP) 
 
        -γR(ΣixiR - xR) - γP(ΣjxjP - xP). 
 
Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives15, the first order conditions for a maximum can be 
written as 
 
(A2) ∂Λ/∂xiR  = WiuiRx - γR  = 0.   (i = 1, ... ,n)  
 
(A3) ∂Λ/∂xjP  = WjujPx - γP = 0.   (j = 1, ... ,m) 
 
(A4) ∂Λ/∂G = ∑i WiuiRG + ∑j WjujPG - λ = 0. 
 
(A5) ∂Λ/∂gR = λ - μRFRg = 0. 
 
(A6) ∂Λ/∂gP = λ - μPFPg = 0. 
 
(A7) ∂Λ/∂xR = - μRFRx + γR = 0. 
 
(A8) ∂Λ/∂xP = - μPFPx + γP = 0. 
 
The marginal rates of substitution are defined as MRSiR = uiRG/uiRx and MRSjP = ujPG/ujPx. 
Substituting these expressions into (A4), this equation can be rewritten as 
 
∑i WiuiRx MRSiR + ∑j WjujPx MRSjP = λ, 
 
or, using equations (A2) and (A3), 
 
(A9) γR ∑i MRSiR + γP ∑jMRSjP = λ. 
 
Combining (A5) and (A7) as well as (A6) and (A8), we can derive the expressions for the 
marginal rates of transformation or the marginal costs of producing the public good: 
 
(A10) λ⁄γR = FRg /FRx = MCR. 
 
(A11) λ⁄γP = FPg /FPx  = MCP. 
 
                                                 
15 Note the distinction between lower-case g, which refers to domestic production of the global public good and 
upper-case G, which represents the global provision of the good.  
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Dividing (A9) by λ and substituting from (A10) and (A11), we obtain 
 
(A12) ∑iMRSiR/MCR  + ∑jMRSjP/MCP  = 1, 
 
which is equation (11) of the main text. 
 
Inequality aversion means that the social marginal utility of consumption in the rich country is 
lower than in the poor country. From (A2) and (A3) this implies that  γR <  γP. From (A10) 
and (A11) one then sees that MCR > MCP. This implies that the marginal willingness to pay 
receives a lower weight in the rich country than in the poor country. 
 
Now assume that there are perfect lump sum transfers both within and between nations. Social 
marginal utilities will then be equalized between countries, implying from (A2) and (A3) that 
γR =  γP and consequently that MCR = MCP. Denoting by MC the common value of the 
marginal cost, equation (7) follows immediately. 
 
Appendix B. Global public goods as factor of production. 
 
As in Appendix A we begin with the case with no international transfers, so that domestic 
consumption of the private good is constrained by equations (9). With global public goods as 
factors of production the public good no longer enters into the consumers’ utility functions, so 
that these become simply uiR = uiR(xiR) and ujP = ujP(xjP). The production constraints are 
represented by equations (12), so that the Lagrangian becomes 
 
(B1) Λ = W(u1R,…., unR; u1P,…., umP) + λ(gR + gP - G) - μRFR(xR, gR, G) - μPFP(xP, gP, G) 
 
        -γR(ΣixiR - xR) - γP(ΣjxjP - xP). 
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are 
 
(B2) ∂Λ/∂xiR  = WiuiRx - γR  = 0.   (i = 1, ... ,n)  
 
(B3) ∂Λ/∂xjP  = WjujPx - γP = 0.   (j = 1, ... ,m) 
 
(B4) ∂Λ⁄∂G = -λ - μRFRG - μPFPG =0.    
   
(B5)    ∂Λ⁄∂gR = λ- μRFRg = 0. 
 
(B6)    ∂Λ⁄∂gP = λ- μPFPg = 0. 
 
(B7)    ∂Λ⁄∂xR = - μRFRx + γR = 0. 
 
(B8)    ∂Λ⁄∂xP = - μPFPx + γP = 0. 
 
Rearranging (B4), we can rewrite this equation as 
 
(B9) μRFRx(-FRG/FRx) + μPFPx(-FPG/FPx)  = λ. 
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The terms in parentheses on the left-hand side are the marginal rates of transformation 
between the global public good and the private good in the two countries, or the marginal 
output effects (MOE). Dividing by λ, (B9) can be rewritten as 
 
(B10) (μRFRx/λ)(MOER) + (μPFPx/λ)(MOEP)  = 1. 
 
Combining (B5) with (B7) and (B6) with (B8), we obtain 
 
B(11) (μRFRx/λ)= (FRg/FRx)-1, (μPFPx/λ) = (FPg/FPx)-1. 
 
These expressions are the inverses of the domestic marginal rates of transformation between 
public and private good production, or the marginal costs of producing the public good. 
Inserting (B11) into (B10), we can therefore write 
 
(B12) (MOER)/MCR + (MOEP)/MCP  = 1. 
 
This corresponds to the optimality condition (11) for the case of global public consumption 
goods. In the case of inequality aversion in the social welfare function, one sees from (B2) 
and (B3) that γR <  γP. Therefore, from (B7), (B8) and the definitions in (B11) it follows that 
MCR > MCP. In deriving the global optimality condition, the marginal output effect in the rich 
country receives a lower weight that that in the poor country. 
 
If, on the other hand, there are perfect lump sum transfers between the countries, it follows 
that γR =  γP and therefore that MCR = MCP. Letting MC be the common value of the marginal 
cost, condition (14) in the main text follows directly from (B12).   
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